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I Comments I
The Death Penalty Is Dead Wrong: Jus
Cogens Norms and the Evolving Standard of
Decency
Geoffrey Sawyer*
The conviction of Amina Lawal in Nigeria for committing adultery
and sentence of death by stoning created an international outcry of
support to overturn her sentence.' The support she received is a
reflection of the outrage many around the world feel toward this
particular method of execution, and in a larger context the growing social
norm that the death penalty should be abolished. As more of the world
looks upon the death penalty as unfair, or cruel and unusual, or as torture,
arguably, a jus cogens norm prohibiting the death penalty has developed
* J.D., Penn State University Dickinson School of Law, May 2004; B.A. Hamilton
College, 1997. I would like to thank my parents for being the inspiration for this
comment. Thank you for always challenging me and encouraging me to think outside the
box. I would also like to thank CEC for being my number one supporter; I truly could
not have done it without you.
1. Merton Amnesty Group, Amina Lawal Must Not Face Death by Stoning,
available at http://www.mertonai.org/amina, (last visited 11/04/02) [hereinafter Merton
Amnesty Website]. On September 27, 2002, Amnesty International, and Merton Amnesty
presented a petition on behalf of the life of Amina Lawal signed by 1.3 million people
from around the world. The website claims that this effort was one of the largest
"mobilizations in the history of the Internet." In addition, world leaders along with
worldwide organizations have protested this sentence.
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in international law, and will ultimately be the vehicle by which the
death penalty will be abolished worldwide.
Part I of this comment will detail the plight of Amina Lawal, and
how her situation is indicative of the globalization of human rights
norms. In Part II, this comment will examine the meaning of a jus
cogens norm and how it can be established in the context of capital
punishment. Using human rights treaties, the law and practice of other
nations, and international tribunal decisions, Part III will assert, citing
other contexts, such as the "right to life," and the already entrenched jus
cogens norm prohibiting torture, that a jus cogens norm abolishing the
death penalty has arguably already been established. Finally, Part IV
will assess what the effect of the establishment of a jus cogens norm
prohibiting capital punishment would be in the United States as it relates
to the U.S Supreme Court's "evolving standard of decency" test for what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
I. Amina Lawal' s Story
Amina Lawal is a Nigerian citizen who was sentenced by a Shari'ah
court to die by stoning on March 22, 2002. She allegedly confessed to
having a child while divorced, which is prima facie evidence to convict a
woman of adultery, and the resulting sentence of death by stoning under
Shari'a law.2
Under the same law, a man cannot be convicted unless there are
four witnesses to the act, and therefore, the father of Amina's child had
the charges dropped.3 Amina did not have an attorney during the first
trial when the sentence was imposed, and subsequent appeals have
failed.4
It is widely argued that the sentence violates Nigeria's Constitution,
but under Nigerian law, Regional States can enact laws that may be
contrary to federal law. 5 The official position of the Nigerian President
has been contradictory. On one level, President Obasanjo has
condemned the sentence,6 yet the Nigerian Government as of this writing
2. Amnesty International, Nigeria: How Much More Suffering Under Sharia Penal
Legislation, available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/content.nsf/
pages/gbr -nigeria#action (last visited 1/15/03).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Merton Amnesty Website (last visited 01/15/03), supra note 1.
6. Amnesty International Press Release, Nigeria: Amina Lawal-the Nigerian
government's double speech, November 14, 2002, available at http://web.amnesty.org/
ai.nsf/print/AFR440222002?OpenDocument (last visited 1/19/03). President Objesanro
stated in a public appearance in October 2002, ".... we cannot imagine or envisage a
Nigerian being stoned to death (... ) it has never happened. And may it never happen."
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has refused to intervene, in spite of apparent authority to do so.'
A. International reaction
The international reaction to Amina's case has been nearly universal
in its condemnation. Mexico's President Vicente Fox has been one of
the loudest voices, personally voicing his concerns to the Nigerian
Government.8 Many nations including France, New Zealand, Sweden
and Australia also decried the sentence. 9 The European Union (EU)
issued strong statements in support of the sentence being overturned, also
revealing the EU's position on the death penalty as a whole: "Our
position on the death penalty is clear: We are against it. And we are
concerned by this case as we would be by any other countries on a
similar issue."' In addition, the United States State Department voiced
concerns over the case, and urged Nigeria to ensure that Lawal's due
process rights are not abrogated."
In the world of public opinion, the reaction has also been very
strongly in support of Lawal. Nearly 1.3 million people from over 100
countries signed an Amnesty International internet petition protesting the
sentence, making it Amnesty International's most successful Internet
campaign ever.12 Even some participants in the Miss World pageant,
which was held in Nigeria in late 2002, boycotted the pageant in support
of Lawal.13 Other human rights groups mobilized their constituencies by
7. See id. On November 4, 2002, Nigerian Foreign Minister Sule Lamido
reportedly defended the use of Shari'a law, and its application to Amina.
8. Lekan Awojoodu, THE U.S. AFRICAN VOICE ONLINE, Shari'a-A Selective or
Religious Punishment, available at http://www.usafricanvoice.com/sharia.htm (last
visited 1/20/03). President Fox is also noteworthy for his public opposition to the U.S.'s
stance on the death penalty, canceling a trip to Texas to protest the execution of a
Mexican citizen. Id.
9. Tobi Soniyi, Stanley Yakubu, and Francis Famoroti, Federal Government Takes
Over Battle to Save Amina-US, EU react, ECONDAD Website, available at
http://www.econdad.org/LawalBackground.htm, (last visited 1/19/03) [hereinafter
ECONDAD website].
10. Id.
11. Id. ECONDAD's report on the Global reaction to Lawal's case included this
quote: "In its reaction, the US called on authorities in Nigeria to ensure that Amina is
given due process in the appeal process. 'To date, we understand that no sentences of
stoning have been carried out in Nigeria,' the Deputy State Department spokesman
Phillip Recker told reporters in Washington." Independent efforts to get an official
United States reaction to Amina's case proved futile.
12. Amnesty International USA, Monthly Update 10/02, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/artistsforamnesty/oct2002.html (last visited 01/15/03).
According to the Amnesty website, after the Amina Lawal story was profiled on the
Oprah Winfrey Show, nearly fifteen E-mails were sent every second to the Nigerian
Embassy.
13. CNN.COM, Miss Denmarkjoins shari'a boycott, October 3, 2002, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/10/03/nigefia.denmark/ (last visited 1/20/03).
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urging them to send petitions and letters of support to President
Obasanjo.14
B. Saifya Husaini
Almost at the same time as Lawal was sentenced, another Nigerian
woman, Safiya Husaini, was acquitted on an apparent technicality after
she had been sentenced to die by stoning for committing adultery. 15
Husaini was also a divorced mother who had a child, (the father of her
child was her ex-husband), and her case ignited a similar reaction from
the international community. 16  The international human rights
community attributes the reversal in Husaini's case to the massive
international human rights campaign and political pressure put on the
Nigerian Federal Government.
17
C. Implications of Amina and Safifya's cases
The nearly universal opposition to these two cases is indicative of
the globalization of human rights issues,' 8 and the countries that have
As of the date of the CNN story, contestants from Spain, France, Belgium, Switzerland,
and Denmark had boycotted. The boycotts originally led to the Nigerian government's
assurance that Amina would not be stoned, but no official action has occurred as of this
writing.
14. ECONDAD website, supra note 9. Just a sampling of human rights groups
involved include: Human Rights Watch; National Organization for Women; Civil
Liberties Organisation (CLO); Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR);
Campaign for Democracy (CD); and the National Coalition on Violence Against Women
who described the ruling as "barbaric" and a "cruel and inhuman application of Sharia
law.
15. Brian Carnell, EquityFeminism.Com, Nigerian Woman's Adultery Death
Sentence Thrown Out, March 27, 2002, available at http://www.equityfeminism.com/
articles/2002/000048.html (last visited 1/20/03).
16. See International Human Rights Campaign, Shari'ah Law, Adultery and Rape,
available at http://www.ishr.org/activities/campaigns/stoning/adultery.htm (last visited
1/19/03). "Safiya Husaini's fate led to world-wide protests, amongst which protest by 77
MPs of the European Parliament and by a parliamentary assembly from 130 countries in
the capital of Morocco, Rabat."
17. See id. "The protests had the effect that the Nigerian Minister of Justice declared
in his letter of 18 March 2002 to the governors of the federal states which had introduced
shari'ah law that shari'ah was unconstitutional, because it officially was only applicable
to Muslims."
18. See Jerome J. Shestack, Globalization of Human Rights Law, 21 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 558 (1997). The author argues that starting from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights through the Covenant on the Rights of the Child, a body of treaties have been
introduced and then come into force establishing a globalization of human rights.
Gradually, these treaties came into force as the requisite number of states
assented. By now, we have a full, comprehensive and impressive body of
substantive international law to protect the rights of the individual. It can,
therefore, be said that human rights standards have now been globalized.
Id. at 559-560.
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condemned the sentences of these two women have cited to human rights
entrenched in treaties and other positive law sources as the foundation
for their objections. 19 In addition, with the advent of the Internet and
global news outlets, no conduct is beyond the concerned eyes of the
world. The implication is that the conduct of each state is now being
viewed through a much broader lens, and a much larger audience
determines the standard for what constitutes "human rights" violations.
Because of increased scrutiny by the world, individual States can no
longer unilaterally decide what is humane without incurring intense
backlash from the international human rights community, and arguably,
without changing their views. The support Lawal has received is a
reflection of how human rights is now a global issue, and jus cogens
norms mark the standard by which "human rights" are defined.
1I. Jus Cogens
A. Defining the scope ofjus cogens
Simply stated, jus cogens norms are principles of law that are
deemed the most fundamental and highly valued that the norm actually
invalidates past or future agreements between individual states.20 What
gives jus cogens norms their force is that states are not free to derogate
21from these norms. Ultimately, it has been argued that jus cogens norms
create a basic and fundamental "international constitution," and state
laws that violate this "international constitution" are void as if they were
in violation of a state constitution.22 Thus, international legal scholars
often cite to jus cogens norms to support substantive claims for policy
change.23
19. See, e.g., Amnesty International USA, Death by Stoning Upheld in the Case of
Nigerian Woman Amina Lawal, August 20, 2002 (Press Release) available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/nigeriaO8202002.html (last visited 1/20/03). In
it's call to mobilize its members in the battle to save Amina Lawal, Amnesty
International USA proclaims Lawal's sentence as violative of the ICCPR Article 7 and
the Convention Against Torture.
20. Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to
International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 587 (1988).
21. Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 359,362 (1988).
The author argues that by its nature and utility, a jus cogens norm is so fundamental that
it serves as a backbone for the International community's legal system.
22. See Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger & Terre E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise:
Amplifying Content-Based Speech Regulations Through Binding International Law, 18
B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 59, 92 (1995). The authors cite to international law scholars
Marek, Fauchille, Scelle, Menzel, and Quadri to make this conclusion.
23. See Christenson, supra note 20, at 615, note 127. Christenson cites various
scholars who have attempted to use jus cogens to distinguish human rights norms, to
invalidate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to prevent the right of self-defense under
2004]
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B. The foundation ofjus cogens
The fundamental principle behind jus cogens is that there are certain
rights and customs that are so ingrained in the international order that
24they become preemptory norms. Jus cogens are often described as
having a higher status in international law than general customary law,
and are norms that "set the very foundations of the international legal
system.
25
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention establishes the principle of jus
26
cogens, 6 and the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law recognizes
that jus cogens "is now widely accepted .. as a principle of customary
law.",27 The roots of jus cogens are founded in natural law theory and
have moral underpinnings requiring their recognition, at least in theory,
by the international community.
1. Natural law theory.
Natural law theory is founded upon the supposition that the law is
ultimately a reflection of moral tenets that have been shaped by reason
and conscience over time.28 Tangentially, jus cogens is predicated on the
theory that certain laws and practices are so fundamental to the human
29
race, that they become the binding law of the international community.
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and to support the progress of the socialist
movement.
24. See id. at 586. The author states that the concept of jus cogens would prevent
several states from, for example, agreeing to "enslave a minority of people, to liquidate a
race, to brutalize dissidents, or to use force against another state." Id.
25. Janis, supra note 21, at 363.
26. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N.T.S. Regis No. 18, 232, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (27) reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L
L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 53 defines jus cogens as "a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." The United States is not a
party to the Convention but has described the Convention as "the authoritative guide to
current treaty law and practice." INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH, (Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, David Wippman
eds.), Chapter 1, 39 (Aspen 2002).
27. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (revised)
§ 102 reporter's note 6 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). Many scholars cite § 102 as justifying
jus cogens norms and their importance in the law of the United States.
28. See Kha G. Nguyen, In Defense of the Child: A Jus Cogens Approach to the
Capital Punishment of Juveniles in the United States, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
401, 417 (citing Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics,
Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REv. 779,780 (1988)).
29. See Christenson, supra note 20, at 586. The author states that the concept of jus
cogens would prevent several states from, for example, agreeing to "enslave a minority of
people, to liquidate a race, to brutalize dissidents, or to use force against another state."
[Vol. 22:3
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The significance of the correlation between jus cogens and natural law
theory is that as the world becomes smaller, in terms of economics,
social practices, and politics, it follows that the moral tenets which shape
the natural law will be shared by more and more of the world, and thus,
more international law will become natural law, and in turn there will be
more jus cogens norms.30
Another widely held theory of international law is the theory of
legal positivism. Legal positivists argue that individual nation states
make their laws based on political versus moral underpinnings.
31
Therefore, in order to assert that jus cogens norms are universally
recognized in international law, at the very least within certain areas of
the law, the theory of jus cogens must be reconciled with the theory of
legal positivism.
2. Compatibility with legal positivism
Legal positivism is founded upon the principle that individual
nation states make their own positive law, or statutory law, constitutions,
and treaties, based on solely political considerations and not on global
human rights.32 However, due in large part to the abuses of Nazism
during the Second World War,33 jus cogens norms, grounded in moral
principles, have increasingly appeared in positive law sources such as
treaties.34 In turn, the preemptory norms that derive from treaties possess
a combination of natural and positive law attributes.35 The implication of
Id. at 586.
30. See H. Lauterpacht, First Report on the Law of Treaties, March 24, 1953, in
Documents of the 5th Session, [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 90, 155-56, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/63. Lauterpacht the special rappatuer in 1953, is considered the driving force
behind the inclusion of jus cogens in the Vienna Convention. He stated that preemptory
norms should be included in the codification of the Law of Treaties because these norms
"may be expressive of rules of international morality so cogent that an international
tribunal would consider them as forming part of those principles of law generally
recognized by civilized nations .... Id. at 155, para. 4. The concept and force of
preemptory norms has only grown since Lauterpacht's comments were published in
1953, and today jus cogens norms are not only widely recognized, but also practiced.
31. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (71h ed. 2000). Black's defines "legal
positivism" as the "[t]heory that legal rules are valid because they are enacted by an
existing political authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not because they are
grounded in morality or in natural law."
32. See E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature (Joseph
Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758) at 55. Vattel stated, "As
to the rights introduced by Treaties or by Custom, there is no room to apprehend that any
one will confound them with the Natural law of nations."
33. Janis, supra note 21, at 361.
34. Id. at 361.
35. Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human
Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L L & COMP.. L. REv. 411, 423 (1989). One commentator
approaches the "complementary" relationship of positivism and jus cogens as follows:
2004]
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this evolution in international law theory is that jus cogens norms can
and do co-exist within a state's positive law. Thus, preemptory norms
are now an embedded reality of international law, while at the same time,
nation-states' self-determination is still retained.
C. Jus Cogens Norms Prevent Unilateral State Action
Traditionally, jus cogens norms prevented two or more nations from
acting together if their actions violated general international law.36
Certain commentators have argued that a jus cogens goes beyond the law
of treaties and indeed restricts unilateral state action.37 It even appears as
if the International Law Commission, a commission established by the
United Nations in 1947 to promote the progressive development of
international law and its codification, 38 contemplated the use of
preemptory norms or jus cogens norms outside the context of treaty
formation when drafting the articles on state responsibility. For example,
Article 33 indicates that a state may not defend a wrongful practice by
invoking a state of necessity if the wrongfulness is preempted by a jus
cogens norm.
39
In the context of human rights, there is even stronger support for jus
cogens norms preventing unilateral state action.40  Because there are
certain human rights that are deemed of such import that they may not be
Legal systems function under a positivist approach until confronted with an
unjust law. Then the natural law principle, especially one that is jus cogens,
overrides the unjust law. The result, even for a positivist, is that the unjust law
is not valid law-it has no authority behind it and need not be obeyed.
Id. at 423.
36. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (7th ed. 2000). Black's definesjus cogens as "A
mandatory norm of general international law from which no two or more nations may
exempt themselves or release one another." Id.
37. See Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J.
INT'LL. 1, 19 (1986). According to Meron:
Even scholars who reserve jus cogens to treaty law tend to agree with the
elementary proposition that international public order, public order of the
international community and international public policy do not allow states to
violate severally such norms as they are prohibited from violating jointly with
other states.
Id. at 19 (citing to H. MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY As A LEGAL COMMUNITY,
19-20 (1980), contra Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the
Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457,481 (1985)).
38. UN Website, International Law Commission, available at http://www.un.org/
law/ilc/introfra.htm (last visited 1/20/03).
39. See Meron, supra note 37, at 19 (quoting 2 Y.B. INT'L. L. COMM'N. 30, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (pt. 2) at 33). Article 33(2)(a) states that "a state of necessity
may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness... if the
international obligation with which the act of the State is not in conformity arises out of a
preemptory norm of general international law."
40. See id. at 15.
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derogated from, 41 then there is "at least a minimum catalogue of
fundamental or elementary human rights., 42 Carrying the proposition
one step further, many scholars conclude that because there are certain
human rights deemed fundamental, then there also must exist norms
deemed fundamental which would supercede unilateral state action.43
D. Criteria Of A Jus Cogens Norm
Although there is some debate as to the scope of a jus cogens norm,
there is a general consensus as to how a jus cogens norm is established.
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention states that a norm becomes
preemptory or a jus cogens norm when the following criteria are met:
(1) it is a norm of general international law; (2) the norm is accepted by
the international community of states as a whole; (3) the norm is immune
from derogation; and (4) the norm is modifiable only by a new norm
having the same status.44
In determining whether a law is a norm of general international law,
it is critical to examine whether the law is of general applicability. In
other words, does the law create "create obligations and/or rights for at
least a great majority of states or other subjects of international law. 'A5
The implication of this assessment is that criteria one and two are
essentially the same.46 Consolidating criteria one and two, the norm
must be recognized by a vast majority of nations as essential to the
public order.47
The third and fourth criterion are what sets a jus cogens norm apart
from other recognized norms in international law,48 and are what give a
41. Such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
American Convention on Human Rights. See INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, done
Nov. 22, 1969, S. EXEC. Doc. F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1978), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
42. Meron, supra note 37, at 16 (quoting van Boven, Distinguishing Criteria of
Human Rights, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 46 (K.
Vasak ed., P. Alston Eng. ed. 1982)).
43. See generally id. at 16.
44. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), Article 53. See also Connie de la Vega & Jennifer
Brown, Can a United States Treaty Reservation Provide a Sanctuary for the Juvenile
Death Penalty?, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 735, 760 (1998) (citing Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and
the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 767, 775 (1997)).
45. de la Vega & Brown, supra note 44, at 760, citing to Kahgan at 775.
46. See generally Kahgan, supra note 44, at 775-776.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 776-777. The author states that, "It is the third criteria enunciated in
the Vienna Convention, the non-derogable nature of what might otherwise be a norm of
custom, that is the dividing line separating principles of general international law from
those of jus cogens. Until a norm has attained widespread recognition that it is not
2004]
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jus cogens norm its only potential power.49 It follows that if a norm is
deemed fundamental to a public order, then in turn it will be deemed non
derogable. 50 The declaration that the norm is non derogable in treaties,
or the valid and widespread recognition that the norm is non derogable
would satisfy criterion three and four.5
E. The Four Factors
To make the argument that the abolition of the death penalty has
become a preemptory or jus cogens norm, the four widely recognized
factors must be met. 52 Because the roots ofjus cogens is natural law, the
first question is whether or not a vast majority of nations have, either in
law or practice, recognized the death penalty to be contrary to
international law and thus have abolished it.53
According to Amnesty International, I ll countries have abolished
the death penalty in law or practice.54 Conversely, 84 countries still use
and retain the death penalty.55 At first glance, it is significant that a
majority of countries in the world have abolished the death penalty, as it
reflects a general custom that capital punishment is wrong. However, the
I l l states which have abolished the death penalty only represents about
60 percent of all countries worldwide, and this statistic alone does not
appear to meet the "vast majority" standard needed to establish a
preemptory or jus cogens norm.
Upon closer inspection, global statistics on the use of capital
derogable, it remains a matter ofjus dispositivum."
49. This comment will later analyze the effect of an established jus cogens norm,
what power it really holds, etc., but if the norm is deemed to be derogable, then its
potential effect is minimized immensely.
50. See, e.g, Shestack, supra note 18, at 559-560.
51. See Kahgan, supra note 44, at 777.
52. Vienna Convention, supra note 44. Factors to establish a preemptory norm:
(1) is a norm of general international law; (2) is accepted by the international community
of states as a whole; (3) is immune from derogation; and (4) is modifiable only by a new
norm having the same status. See also de la Vega & Brown, supra note 44, at 760, citing,
Carin Khagan, supra note 44, at 775.
53. See generally Shestack, supra note 18.
54. Amnesty International, Website Against the Death Penalty, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/rmp/dplibrary.nsf/ba4275cdead20d858025677e0059735b/ 46 e4de
9db9087e3580256881 0050f05fOpenDocument (last visited 11/30/02) [hereinafter
Amnesty Website]. Amnesty breaks down the 111 countries who have abolished the
death penalty in law and practice as follows: 76 countries and territories have abolished
the death penalty for all crimes; 15 countries have abolished the death penalty for all but
exceptional crimes such as wartime crimes; and 20 countries can be considered
abolitionist in practice: they retain the death penalty in law but have not carried out any
executions for the past 10 years or more and are believed to have a policy or established
practice of not carrying out executions.
55. Id.
[Vol. 22:3
THE DEATH PENALTY IS DEAD WRONG
punishment paints a slightly different picture. In 2001, executions were
carried out in only 31 different countries, 56 which means that 84 percent
of the countries worldwide did not execute anyone in 2001.
Additionally, of all the known executions in 2001, 90 percent took place
in only four countries, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. 5
7
Finally, on average, more than three countries a year have abolished the
death penalty for all crimes over the past decade.58
There are multiple conclusions that can be drawn from the statistics.
First, there appears to be an emerging international trend to abolish the
death penalty. If more than three countries a year on average completely
abolish the death penalty, then more than 72 percent of the world will
have abolished the death penalty in law or practice by the year 2012.
Second, the fact that a vast majority of executions take place in only four
countries indicates that at the very minimum, the rest of the world (the
other 191 countries surveyed) views the death penalty as something that
should be carried out only in the rarest of circumstances, and thus the
wide application of the death penalty in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
the United States violates international custom and norms. At a
minimum there is at least a widely held opposition to the death penalty
throughout the world.
Currently there is one treaty adopted by some members of the
international community that deals specifically with the abolition of the
death penalty. As of this writing there are 65 nations who have become
parties or have signed, but not yet ratified, the Second Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.59 The
Protocol provides for the total abolition of the death penalty but allows
states to retain the death penalty in time of war if they make a reservation
to that effect.60 Considering that only eight countries had abolished the
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. According to the Amnesty Website: "Over 30 countries and territories have
abolished the death penalty for all crimes since 1990. They include countries in Africa
(examples include Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa), the
Americas (Canada, Paraguay), Asia (Hong Kong, Nepal) and Europe (Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine)."
59. SECOND OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, AIMING AT THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, G.A. res. 44/128, annex,
44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force July 11,
1991. The Protocol was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, and any
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can become a party to the
Protocol (there are 149 parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political rights). Currently the list
of countries that have become parties or have signed and not ratified the Protocol includes:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Finland,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. This list is not exhaustive.
60. Amnesty Website, available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/rmp/
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death penalty for all crimes in 1948,61 65 is an astounding number,
especially in light of the fact that 30 countries have done so in the past
decade.62
If the number of countries who were signatories to the Protocol was
165 instead of 65, this analysis would be complete. Abolition of the
death penalty would be a norm of general international law that is
accepted by a vast majority of the international community. The norm is
non-derogable, because the Protocol does not allow for derivation from
the norm except in times of war, and the norm could only be modified by
a new protocol of equal status.63 The result would be a jus cogens norm
and all that would be left for this article is a discussion of the practical
effect of the establishment of such a norm.
Although the number of countries signing the Protocol and
abolishing the death penalty is rising, any author would be hard pressed
to conclude that a jus cogens norm has been established based solely on
65 countries signing or ratifying the Second Optional Protocol. Instead
the analysis must dig deeper, and pull from other treaties and positive
law sources an amalgamation of various non-derogable rights, and from
that mixture make the conclusion that a jus cogens norm has been
established prohibiting the death penalty internationally.
III. Positive Law Sources Establishing a Jus Cogens Norm Prohibiting
the Death Penalty
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights64 was adopted
by the United Nations, and is considered the foundation of fundamental
human rights enjoyed by every person.65  Article 3 of the Universal
dplibrary.nsf/ff6dd728f6268d0480256aab003d14a8/223935dc8bd3e9afS025682c005a35
79!OpenDocument (last visited 11/30/02).
61. Eric Prokosch, Human Rights v. The Death Penalty: Abolition and Restriction in
Law and Practice (December 1998), in THE DEATH PENALTY: ABOLITION iN EUROPE
(Tanja Kleinsorge & Barbara Zatloka eds. 1999), Chapter 1 available at
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ACT500131998?OpenDocument&of-THEMES\DE
ATH+PENALTY (last visited 11/30/02) [hereinafter Prokosch], pg. 1.
62. Amnesty Website, supra note 54.
63. See Vienna Convention Article 53, supra note 44.
64. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://www.amnesty.ie/about/udhr.shtml (last visited 11/30/02) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
65. See Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect to World Opinion on the Death
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2002). In this reprint of Professor Koh's
lecture, Koh argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a direct result of
the atrocities committed by the Nazi's during World War II. In the aftermath of World
War II, the human rights movement was born, and the Universal Declaration of Human
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Declaration states that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person. 66 There is much debate as to the extent of this fairly
broad provision, but there is evidence that the Human Rights
Commission67 at least considered adding a provision to Article 3
abolishing the death penalty.68 In spite of many members support, the
Commission instead opted for the general language of Article 3 without
an explicit prohibition.69 Commission members ultimately determined
that the political infeasibility of a total abolition would undermine the
Universal Declaration, and thus determined that further treaties would
have to explicitly deal with the abolition of the death penalty.7°
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),71
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, was the treaty
designed to implement the various provisions of the Universal
Declaration.72 Article 6 explicitly addresses the death penalty, and is an
expansion of the Universal Declaration's general provision guarding the
right to life.73 Article 6(2) of the ICCPR states that "In countries which
have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed
Rights was the articulation of that movement.
66. Universal Declaration, art. 3.
67. The Human Rights Commission, who did most of the drafting of the Universal
Declaration, was activated in January 1947, and had members from 18 nations, appointed
by ECOSOC: Australia, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), Chile,
China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Lebanon, Panama, Philippine Republic, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, and
Yugoslavia. Its first session met in January and February of 1947. Peter Danchin, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at
http://www.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/mmt/udhr/udhr-general/drafting-history-4.htm
1.
68. Mary Ann Glendon, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 152 (2001).
69. Id. at 152.
70. See Koh, supra note 65, at 1094. The author notes the Soviets particular
objection to the death penalty and their urging to include the abolition of the death
penalty in all the commission's manifestations. The commission as a whole found this to
be politically impossible at that time, and instead further treaties, which would implement
the Universal Declaration, were to be the vehicle to create a ban on capital punishment.
71. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force March 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
b3ccpr.htm (last visited 11/30/02).
72. Id. at 1094.
73. ICCPR, art. 6. For example clause 1 reads: "Every human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life."
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only for the most serious crimes. 7 4  The Human Rights Committee,
which was established under the ICCPR,75 stated in a general comment
about Article 6 that "the expression 'most serious crimes' must be read
restrictively to mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional
measure."
76
Scholars frequently attach jus cogens status to the inherent right to
life provision of Article 6(1).77 The "right to life" is widely recognized
in many positive law sources, and is also regarded as non-derogable.78
The official comment to Article 6 embodies the spirit of jus cogens:
"The right to life enunciated in article 6 of the Covenant has been dealt
with in all State reports. It is the supreme right from which no
derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation (art. 4).''79
What is critically important about the "right to life" jus cogens is
not whether the norm extends, for the purpose of this comment, to the
death penalty, but instead simply that the "right to life" is a norm of
general international law, fixed in many positive law sources, and for
which there is no derogation allowed.8 ° In addition, it is clear that the
"right to life" provision of Article 6 is not to be construed narrowly,81 but
74. ICCPR, art. 6(2).
75. Prokosch, supra note 61, at 4.
76. REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No.
40 at 94, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982).
77. See W.P. Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability:
Preemptory Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Ramcharan ed., 1985). "The right to life is protected under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in its Preamble and in article 3. Furthermore, the right to life is protected
by customary international law. However, the main source... is to be found in article 6
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights... in which.., the right to
life is jus cogens and may not be derogated by any state party even during periods of
emergency .... Similar provisions are found in regional conventions." Id. at 111. See
also Janis, supra note 21, at 359. Janis wrote: "There certainly exists a consensus that
certain rights-the right to life, to freedom from slavery or torture-are so fundamental
that no derogation may be made." Id. at 359. See also Parker & Neylon, supra note 35,
at 431. See also, A.V. Ribero, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON
THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF INTOLERANCE AND OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
RELIGION OR BELIEF, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/35 (1987). Ribero states: "The right to
life.., is one of the rights universally recognized as forming part of jus cogens and
entailing, on the part of States, obligations erga omnes toward the international
community as a whole."
78. See id. Scholars justify the inclusion of the "right to life" as a jus cogens norm.
79. THE RIGHT TO LIFE (ART 6): 30/07/82--CCPR General Comment 6, [1], [5], UN
Doc HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1, 6 (1982) [hereinafter Article 6].
80. Vienna Convention, Article 53, supra, note 44.
81. See Article 6, supra note 71. Further along in the official comment to Article 6:
"However, the Committee has noted that quite often the information given concerning
article 6 was limited to only one or other aspect of this right. It is a right which should
not be interpreted narrowly."
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at the same time does not on its face preclude capital punishment.
C. Prohibition Against Torture
Another commonly recognized jus cogens norm is the prohibition
against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It
is widely recognized as being a general norm of international law that
appears in every aforementioned positive law source or treaty.82
Additionally, there is no derogation permitted from this norm,8 3 and
therefore the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, meets the four factor test articulated in Article
53 of the Vienna Convention and is a jus cogens norm.
There are two recognized positive law treaties that articulate the
preemptory norm against torture, Article 7 of the ICCPR, and the
Convention Against Torture, other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment.84 The Convention Against Torture prohibits
the intentional infliction of "severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental. 85 It could be argued that capital punishment would fall within a
strict reading of Article I, but the official comments, exceptions, and
tribunal interpretations, demonstrate that the drafters of the Convention
Against Torture did not initially intend this instrument to be the vehicle
that would completely abolish every method of capital punishment. 86 In
fact, the last sentence of Article I reads: "It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions."87
D. Other treaties/U.N. reports
Further treaties, mainly regional treaties, and reports from the UN
have expanded the plain meaning of Article 6. For example, Article 4(4)
82. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 5;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art. 7; American
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 41, art. 5; EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, in force Sept. 3, 1953,
Europ. T.S. No. 5, art. 3; Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV),
14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1960), principle 9.
83. Article 4(2) of the ICCPR explicitly states no derogation is permitted from
Article 7.
84. Article 7 of the ICCPR and, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
85. See id., Article I.
86. See William A. Schabas, International law and Abolition of the Death Penalty,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 808 (1998).
87. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 84.
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of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)88 states that the
death penalty shall not be inflicted "for political offences or related
common crimes. ' 89 Also, the Human Rights Committee commented that
"the imposition ... of the death penalty for offenses which cannot be
characterized as the most serious, including apostasy, committing a
homosexual act, illicit sex, embezzlement by officials, and theft by force,
is incompatible with article 6 of the Covenant."90  The UN Special
Rapporteur stated that the death penalty "should be eliminated for crimes
such as economic crimes and drug related offenses." 91
The United Nations has also spoken quite loudly through various
resolutions about their opposition to the death penalty. In 1971, the
United Nation's General Assembly adopted a resolution that stated, "in
order to fully guarantee the right to life, provided for in Article 3 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the main objective to be
pursued is that of progressively restricting the number of offences for
which the capital punishment may be imposed, with a view to the
desirability of abolishing this punishment in all countries."9 2  This
resolution has been reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly once, by the
UN Commission on Human Rights twice (the latest in 1998), and was
reaffirmed by the European Union in 1998.93
E. Jus Cogens Norms as Applied by International Tribunals and U.S.
Courts
These various treaties and United Nation's resolutions at least in
theory establish a norm against capital punishment, but the true test is
how they are put to practice. Considering that 90 percent of all
executions take place in only four countries, it would seem as if the rest
of the world is following the mandate of the ICCPR, and restricting their
use of capital punishment only to the rarest of cases.9 4 The European
Union and Council on Europe actually requires potential new members
to prohibit capital punishment, with the result being that countries like
88. AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
145 O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention].
89. Id. art 4(4).
90. Prokosch, supra note 61, at 4 (citing UN Document No. CCPR/C/79/Add.85
(November 19, 1997), 8).
91. Id. at 4 (citing UN Document No. E/CN.4/1997/60 (December 24, 1996), 91).
92. Resolution 2857 (XXVI) (December 20, 1971).
93. By the UN General Assembly through Resolution 32/61 (December 8, 1977), by
the UN Commission on Human Rights in resolutions 1997/12 (April 3, 1997) and
Resolution 1998/8 (April 3, 1998), and by the European Union in the Guidelines to EU
Policy towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty ("EU Guidelines"), adopted in
1998. Prokosch, supra note 61, at 3.
94. ICCPR Article 6, supra note 71.
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Poland and Turkey, with sometimes suspect human rights practices, are
taking real steps to abolish the death penalty.95
In 1993 and 1994, when international criminal tribunals were
established in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security
Council excluded the death penalty as a possible penalty for the genocide
and war crimes committed.96 Additionally, the adoption in July 1998 of
the Statute of the International Criminal Court does not include the death
penalty as a possible punishment for the crimes of genocide, other crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.97 The implication is that if the
international community is assessing the appropriate penalties for some
of the most heinous crimes imaginable, such as genocide, and yet still
exclude execution as even a possible form of punishment, then it is hard
to imagine what crimes would fit within Article 6's language of the
"most serious crimes."
In spite of the debate regarding what "the most serious crimes"
confers, what is clearly precluded is the "arbitrary deprivation of life,"
and the drafters of Article 6 mandated that states parties to the ICCPR
proscribe some limits to a state taking a human life. 98 These restrictions
are manifested in Constitutional provisions drafted prior to Article 6 and
drafted post Article 6. Many states use their constitutional limits on the
deprivation of life to justify capital punishment, the United States being
exemplary of such practice. In the United States reservations to Article 6
and Article 7 (dealing with "torture"), the United States justifies the
retention of capital punishment on grounds that the Fifth, Eight, and/or
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution restrict the
death penalty. 99
95. Koh, supra note 65, at 1122. The author states that because of the EU and
Council on Europe Policy: "steps have been taken to abolish or impose a moratorium on
the death penalty in such countries as Taiwan, Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey,
Chile, the Philippines, Russia, Bermuda, and Poland."
96. Prokosch, supra note 61, at 4.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Article 6, supra note 71. "The protection against arbitrary deprivation of life
which is explicitly required by the third sentence of article 6(1) is of paramount
importance. The Committee considers that States parties should take measures not only
to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary
killing by their own security forces. The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State
is a matter of the utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must strictly control and limit the
circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by such authorities."
99. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 645 1992). "The United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent
that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 654.
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1. International practice
International tribunals, as recently as thirteen years ago, have
refused to hold the death penalty as per se violative of the prohibition
against torture or cruel and unusual punishment articulated in both the
ICCPR and Covenant Against Torture. 00 The United States Supreme
Court decisions of the past 25 years are in accord with the decisions of
international tribunals, 10' and even the U.N. Human Rights Committee
has refused to hold all forms of capital punishment in violation of the
prohibition against torture and other cruel and unusual punishment. 10 2
The Human Rights Committee did conclude that California's gas
chamber violated Article 7 of the ICCPR. 10 3 The Committee reasoned
that even though Article 6 allows capital punishment for the "most
serious" crimes, the penalty "must be carried out in such a way as to
cause the least possible physical and mental suffering."',0 4 Because the
gas chamber resulted in prolonged pain and suffering, it sometimes took
at least 10 minutes for a prisoner to die, the gas chamber violated Article
7, and was deemed "cruel and unusual."'
10 5
Similarly, in Fierro v. Gomez, the Ninth Circuit held that the gas
chamber was in violation of the Eight Amendment's prohibition against
"cruel and unusual punishment., 10 6  The Fierro court used the same
reasoning as the Human Rights Committee did in Ng v. Canada,10 7 in
finding, based mainly on factual evidence, that the gas chamber inflicts,
"extreme pain, the length of time this extreme pain lasts, and the
substantial risk that inmates will suffer this extreme pain for several
minutes."
10 8
100. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
101. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976) (plurality opinion). The
Court in Gregg was explaining the holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
where the Furman Court held that certain applications of the death penalty did violate the
Eight Amendment.
102. GENERAL COMMENT 20(44), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., 1138th
mtg. at 1-4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 (1992).
103. REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, Ng v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Vol. 2, at 205, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994)
[hereinafter Ng v. Canada]. The Committee found California's gas chamber to be cruel
and inhuman.
104. Id. at § 16.2 (quoting General Comment 20[44] on article 7 of the Covenant
(CCPR/C/2 1/Add.3, paragraph 6)).
105. Id. at § 16.3.
106. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
107. See Ng. v. Canada, supra note 103.
108. Fierro, 77 F.3d at 309.
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2. Lethal injection
Interestingly, the Human Rights Committee found that lethal
injection did not violate the prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment,"'109 in spite of empirical data detailing the suffering of those
put to death using that method. l 0 The reasoning for this position was
that lethal injection was the same method used for euthanasia and is "on
the end of the spectrum of methods designed to cause the least pain.''111
The Committee's position is clear, that putting an individual to death
would not constitute torture or cruel and unusual punishment as long as it
is "humane."
What the Committee does not state is that lethal injection does not
inflict any pain. Because the AMA prohibits any physician from
participating in the execution of any individual,112 mishaps do occur, and
pain and suffering is the logical consequence of mishap. 
13
In addition, because the first drug administered to a prisoner renders
the individual paralyzed, it is not apparent what the individual is
experiencing, because the individual literally cannot exhibit physical
signs of pain and suffering. 14 Without physical manifestations of pain,
109. See REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITrEE, Kindler v. Canada (No.
470/1991), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, at § 9.6 (1993) [hereinafter, Kindler v. Canada]. This position
was reaffirmed only 12 months after Ng v. Canada, in, UN Human Rights Committee,
Geneva/New York, Extradition to the United States to Face the Possible Imposition of
the Death Penalty Not Considered to Violate the CCPR/Cox v. Canada, 15 HuM. RTS.
L.J. 410, 417 (1994) [hereinafter Cox v. Canada].
110. Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA
L. REv. 319, 380-381 (1997). The author lists, fairly comprehensively, the myriad of
problems that can arise during the execution of a human being via lethal injection.
111. Kindler v. Canada, supra note 109, at § 9.7.
112. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS
(CEJA), Ethical Opinion 2.06, available at http://www.amaassn.org/
apps/pfonline/pfonlinef n=browse&doc=policyfiles/CEJA/E-2.06.HTM. Ethical
Opinion 2.06 states in pertinent part that "[a] physician, as a member of a profession
dedicated to preserving life when there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in
a legally authorized execution." Later in the Opinion, the CEJA specifically addresses
what would constitute physician participation in an execution by lethal injection:
In the case where the method of execution is lethal injection, the following
actions by the physician would also constitute physician participation in
execution: selecting injection sites; starting intravenous lines as a port for a
lethal injection device; prescribing, preparing, administering, or supervising
injection drugs or their doses or types; inspecting, testing, or maintaining lethal
injection devices; and consulting with or supervising lethal injection personnel.
Id.
113. Denno, supra note 110, at 380-38 1. The author lists the problems that can arise
during the execution of a human being via lethal injection, exacerbated by the fact that
trained physicians cannot participate.
114. Id. at 380-381.
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at least the spectrum that the punishment is humane remains somewhat in
tact, and the State can justify the execution of an individual using this
method. Perhaps that is why in the United States 70 of 71 executions in
2002115 were by lethal injection.
The preemptory norm prohibiting the use of torture or cruel and
unusual punishment does not reach far enough to establish a jus cogens
norm completely abolishing the death penalty, but it does create a
preemptory norm that, at the least, establishes a threshold that the
punishment be humane. Similarly, the "right to life" jus cogens norm
does not extend to prevent states such as the United States from
continuing to execute its prisoners, but again, at least there is a threshold
that the taking of life cannot be arbitrary, and must only be for the most
serious crimes. 116 Taking these norms together and applying them to the
state sponsored execution of a prisoner would only be permissible in the
rarest occasions, if at all. The question then becomes, have U.S. courts
interpreted these norms as being preemptory, and what role do they play
in adjudicating death penalty cases?
IV. The Evolving Standard of Decency
The death penalty has a long and sometimes controversial history in
the United States. Most often litigated in United States death penalty
challenges is the issue of whether the practice violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Internationally, the Human Rights Committee has found that the
death penalty does not per se violate the ICCPR's Article VII prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishment," but the practice must be carried
out humanely.1 7 Similarly courts in the United States have found
various methods of executions to violate the Eight Amendment, based
mainly on whether the practice was humane." 8
William Schabas and other scholars have argued that "cruel"
punishment is an evolving standard that may, in the 21st Century, now
include capital punishment.' 19 The argument would be that the "evolving
115. United States Department of Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Capital Punishment Statistics, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm (last
visited 1/15/03) [hereinafter Bureau of Justice Statistics].
116. See ICCPR, art. 6(2), supra, note 71.
117. ICCPR, supra note 41, art. 7.
118. See, e.g., Fierro, supra note 106.
119. Schabas, supra note 86, at 808-809. The author quotes the United States
Supreme Court from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), where the Court stated that
the definition of "cruel and unusual punishment" is determined by "evolving standards of
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standard of decency" used to determine what is "cruel and unusual
punishment" in the 21"t Century is much different than in 1789, and that
indeed new standards of "cruel and unusual" prohibits the application of
the death penalty in most if not all situations.
1. Evolving "standard of decency"
Supreme Court cases are mixed as to what standard is to be applied
and the role that international norms play in assessing the standard of
cruel and unusual punishment. In Trop v. Dulles, the Court stated that
the definition of "cruel and unusual punishment" is determined by
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."
120
Thirty-one years later, the Court in Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), a
juvenile death penalty case, Justice Scalia's majority opinion argued that
the audience to judge what is "cruel and unusual" is the citizens of the
United States, and the court should not "embark rudderless upon a wide-
open sea.' 21  In other words, US Courts should look to evolving
standards of decency as marked by United States citizens, not
international norms.
2. Atkins
And then along comes Atkins v. Virginia,122 where the Court cites
the Trop "evolving standard of decency" test for what constitutes
"cruel," and states that "the basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."'123 In assessing
what the "evolving standard" has become the Court cites as persuasive
evidence a "consensus" against executions and "overwhelming
disapprov[al]" of "the world community" in its reasoning to hold that
executing the mentally retarded is unconstitutional.
24
Just this year, the Supreme Court decided to hear the case of Roper
v. Simmons. 25 The case involves Christopher Simmons, who was 17
when he was arrested for the murder of Shirley Crook. Simmons
appealed his case on a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Missouri Supreme
Court. In late 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court held that juvenile
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
120. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
121. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
122. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the death penalty for the
mentally retarded is unconstitutional).
123. Id. at 311 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-102 (1958)).
124. Id. at 325.
125. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d. 397 (Mo. 2003).
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executions violated the Eighth Amendment's provision against cruel and
unusual punishment under the "evolving standards of decency" test.
126
Consequentially, Simmons' death sentence was vacated, and the State of
Missouri appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Missouri Supreme Court's reasoning was based on a reading of
Atkins that overturned Scalia's reasoning in Stanford.127  Therefore,
according to the Missouri high court, it is appropriate to consider both a
national and international "consensus" in determining the evolving
standard of decency. 128 It is hard to predict how the Supreme Court will
rule, but if their reasoning is based on the Court's most recent precedent
in Atkins, it is likely that the Court will find the death penalty as applied
to juveniles is cruel and unusual.
B. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life
Although the focus has been on "cruel and unusual," there is at least
an argument to be made that the U.S. death penalty violates the jus
cogens norm prohibiting the arbitrary taking of life. 129  The Supreme
Court seems to indirectly recognize and uphold this norm, 30 stating in
Furman v. Georgia: 'In determining whether a punishment comports
with human dignity, we are aided also by a second principle inherent in
the Clause-that the State must not arbitrarily inflict a severe
punishment."'131 This reasoning is in direct accord with Article 6 of the
ICCPR.
132
Thus far, the Court has yet to find that the death penalty, except in
specific circumstances, is the "arbitrary" deprivation of life. However,
on January 11, 2003, Governor George Ryan of Illinois granted
clemency to more than 150 death row inmates. 133 The main reasoning
behind Governor Ryan's 11th hour decision was that there was too much
evidence that the death penalty in Illinois was being applied arbitrarily.
134
126. Id. at 413.
127. Id. at 411.
128. Id. at410-411.
129. See ICCPR Article 6, supra note 98.
130. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(describing the holding in, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
131. Furman, 408 U.S. at 273 (1972).
132. ICCPR Article 6, supra note 71.
133. Emily Kaiser, Illinois Gov. Commutes All Death Sentences, Reuters, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43011-2003Janl 1.html (last visited
1/19/03).
134. Id. "A commission Ryan created to review the Illinois system found the poor
were at a disadvantage, too many crimes drew the death penalty and police abuse and
jailhouse informants too often resulted in capital convictions. The commission looked at
160 cases of people then on death row, but not all inmates asked for a clemency review."
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For many of these same reasons, the ABA has called for a national
moratorium on executions, 35 and general support for the practice
nationally has been eroding.' 
36
V. Conclusion
The Court's reasoning in Atkins, evokes at the very least natural law
theory, and at the most, the very essence of jus cogens. 137 The result is
that jus cogens norms are creeping into the reasoning of the Supreme
Court as they adjudicate death penalty cases, and into the consciousness
of the regular American.
Nothing embodies this shift in the evolving standard of decency
then the story of Amina Lawal. Her story was on the Oprah Winfrey
Show, 138 and as mentioned above, support for her release was
widespread. Twenty years ago, no one would have ever heard her story,
and it is unlikely then that any intervention would have been as swift and
as uniform in its condemnation as it was today.
What her story most embodies is that the values espoused in our
own Constitution and the values embodied in Americans seem to be
more closely aligning with an international standard. The evolving
standard of decency, shaped invariably by jus cogens norms, has shifted
towards the conclusion that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment, and can often mean the arbitrary deprivation of life. The
Supreme Court and American public are fmally recognizing these norms,
and the U.S.'s violation of them, meaning that jus cogens norms have
become a more viable means to establish the ultimate end, abolition.
135. RECOMMENDATION No. 107, American Bar Association 1997 Midyear Meeting,
February 3, 1997, available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/recl07.html (last visited
1/20/03). The moratorium called for every state that imposes capital punishment to not
do so until procedures where implemented to prevent the arbitrary imposition of the
sentence of death: including ensuring competent counsel, eliminating the racial
discrepancies in the imposition of the death penalty, and streamlining the appeals process.
136. See Polling Report on Crime, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/
crime.htm. In a January 2003 NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll conducted by the
polling organizations of Peter Hart (D) and Robert Teeter (R), 34% of Americans felt
there should be a moratorium on the death penalty until death penalty procedures are
examined. In a May 2002 Gallup poll, 69% of Americans opposed the death penalty for
Juveniles, 75% opposed the death penalty for the mentally ill, and 82% opposed the death
penalty for the mentally retarded.
137. Infra text p.6; see also, supra notes 20-23.
138. Amina Lawal's story aired in 2002 on the Oprah Winfrey Show. Oprah called
for 1 million e-mails in support of Amina, and 123 million viewers obliged. Oprah
Winfrey Show Website, available at http://www.oprah.com/tows/pastshows/
tows_2002/tows-past_20021004_b.jhtml (last visited 1/20/03).
2004]

